A new setting for analyzing problems in information-based complexity is formulated and discussed. By using concepts from two-person zero-sum game theory, a randomized setting results from defining the nth minimal radius as an infimum over "mixed" strategies of information operators and algorithms. After presenting an example, some general results are developed on the randomized radius and its relationship to average and worst case radii. o 1987 Academic PW. IK. In formulating problems in order to study their complexity, there is growing awareness of the importance of the setting in which we measure the error and cost of algorithms. While the time-honored worst case setting may be appropriate in situations where one must ensure against catastrophe, recent emphasis has been increasingly directed toward average case analysis. To employ an average case criterion, however, one must be willing and able to assume some fixed and presumably realistic probability distribution on the space of problem elements. This is not always an easy task and it often occurs that the choice of a distribution is based more on simplicity and computational convenience than on knowledge of the sort of problem elements that are likely to be encountered.
In formulating problems in order to study their complexity, there is growing awareness of the importance of the setting in which we measure the error and cost of algorithms. While the time-honored worst case setting may be appropriate in situations where one must ensure against catastrophe, recent emphasis has been increasingly directed toward average case analysis. To employ an average case criterion, however, one must be willing and able to assume some fixed and presumably realistic probability distribution on the space of problem elements. This is not always an easy task and it often occurs that the choice of a distribution is based more on simplicity and computational convenience than on knowledge of the sort of problem elements that are likely to be encountered.
In this paper we present, in the context of information-based complexity, a setting for analysis that has the potential to avoid the undue pessimism of the worst case without making the often unwarranted assumption of a known distribution needed for the average case. The basic idea is to allow for the possibility of random "moves" by the algorithm designer in terms of information gathered about problem elements and how that information is dealt with. This approach, which will lean heavily on the formalism of two-person zero-sum game theory, is certainly not new. It has antecedents in statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girschick, 1954; Savage, 1972) and in the Monte Carlo methods of numerical analysis. More recently, randomization methods in computer science have led to interesting results. Rabin (1976) considers "probabilistic algorithms" and Yao (1977) has developed a notion of randomized complexity for discrete problems that is very much in the spirit of what is proposed here for continuous problems having partial information. Wasilkowski (1987) also considers the efficacy of randomization for continuous problems in which information is provided by function evaluations.
The randomized setting that will result from our game-theoretic treatment will give rise to a randomized radius of information for a problem that is generally bounded below by the average case radius and bounded above by the worst case radius. The resultant notion of randomized complexity will be correspondingly bounded by the average and worst case complexities.
In the next section we sketch relevant results from information-based complexity. The following section summarizes ideas needed from twoperson game theory and relates them to our interest in approximately solving continuous problems. We show by example that so-called worst case optimal error algorithms are not generally optimal in the game-theoretic sense. This provides motivation for considering randomized (mixed strategy) algorithms. We then present some of the possible advantages of a randomized approach and develop some general results. The final section discusses some of the difficulties associated with this approach along with a number of open questions that arise.
RELEVANT CONCEPTS FROM INFORMATION-BASED COMPLEXITY
In this section we present selected ideas from information-based complexity in a form that will mesh well with the decision-theoretic concepts of the following section. For more complete and systematic surveys of information-based complexity, the reader is referred to Woiniakowski (1986) and Packel and Woiniakowski (1987) .
Let S: F+ G be a mapping between normed linear spaces (the solution operator) and let N: F + IV' be an information operator providing information on each problem element f E F. We denote a class of allowable information operators with range R" by N,, , where the positive integer n is the cardinality of information.
We seek to approximate Sf knowing only the information Nf about f rather thanfitself. Then any function 4: Rn + G defines an algorithm that will use the vector information provided by an information operator from N,, to approximate Sf. We let @'n denote a class of allowable algorithms for the problem in question.
For a given choice of information N, algorithm 4, and problem element f, the resulting error is given by l]Sf -Q(Nf)(l. Define the worst case error for information N and an algorithm 4 by
If we assume that any choice of information and algorithm will encounter a problem element maximizing the error, we obtain the worst case nth minimal radius for S by defining r-p'"'(S) = inf{e(N, 4) : (N, 4) E N, X Qn}.
A pair (N, $) for which the above infimum is achieved is defined to be an optimal error informationallalgorithm pair for S. For simplicity we assume throughout that infimum values are obtained.
Given an error tolerance E r 0 and a "model of computation" (see Woiniakowski (1986) for a development of this topic) in which cost is approximately proportional to the cardinality of information used, the Algorithm Designer will naturally seek the minimal cardinality of information n such that ry' (S) 5 E. We assume such a model of computation and we fix n to be this minimal value. Given (N, 4) E N, x a, and f E F, let cost(N, f) denote the information cost of computing N(f) and let cost(4, N( f )) denote the combinatory cost of computing 4(N( f )). We can now define the fundamental idea of &-complexity in the worst case setting for a problem S: F + G,
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A pair (N, c$) for which the above infimum results is defined to be an optimal E-complexity information/algorithm pair. If we assume that the information cost depends only on the cardinality of information n (i.e., it is independent off) and that the combinatory cost is negligible in comparison to the information cost, the search for such optimal pairs essentially reduces to the search for optimal error information/algorithm pairs. With this rationale, we focus in the remainder of the paper on issues involving error minimization and the nth minimal radius.
To develop ideas analogous to those above in an average case setting we assume a known probability distribution over the set F of problem elements in the form a measure p on a r-algebra of subsets of F. Then the error that results from an information-algorithm pair (N, C#J) is defined by J#f -~#@")ll~(df). The average case nth minimal radius for S is then defined by
We will henceforth assume appropriate measurability properties of integrands so that integrals with respect to our probability measures are defined. It follows easily that rY(S, ,u) I r, ""'"'(S) V IZ E N whatever probability measure p is assumed on F. In either setting, the nth minimal radius can be neatly formulated without reference to the idea of algorithms at all (Traub and Woiniakowski, 1980; Wasilkowski, 1983) , emphasizing that it represents (for each fixed n) the uncertainty inherent in the problem defined by S. This algorithm-independent formulation also has geometrical aspects that justify the use of the term "radius." For our game-theoretic purposes we choose to emphasize the idea of taking an infimum over the space Cp of allowable algorithms.
To illustrate the above ideas and set the stage for later developments, we consider a simple integration example. Let the space F of problem elements be defined by The solution operator S whose values we seek to approximate is the definite integral, Sf= /Af(t)dt. For any n we take as our space of allowable information N, the result of function evaluations at any n points on (0, 1). Thus any N E N,, can be specified by selecting tl, t2, . . . , t, with 0 < tl < t2 < * -* < t, < 1 so that Nf = [f(tr), f(tJ, . . . , f&J].
In the worst case setting it is not difficult to see that, for any given 12, optimal information is obtained by choosing the tl equally spaced over [0, I] (see Fig. 1 ). It is also apparent that an optimal algorithm for any function evaluation information is simply trapezoidal integration. It follows that a problem element resulting in the largest error is a "sawtooth" function of the form illustrated in Fig. 1 . The nth minimal radius in the worst case is therefore the area under the sawtooth and we get ryt(S) = 1/4(n + 1). To ensure an error no larger than E, we must have IZ 2 r1/4& -11 and a major step in determining the worst case &-complexity of this integration problem has been illustrated. Much more general results along these lines can be obtained for different classes F. The reader may find over 100 papers referenced in Traub and Woiniakowski (1980 In an average case setting, the first challenge is to come up with a reasonable measure on the function space F. Since Lebesgue-type measures do not exist on infinite-dimensional spaces, recent attention has been centered on Wiener and, more generally, Gaussian measures on such spaces. Lee and Wasilkowski (1986) have obtained numerous results in such a setting which may apply to our specific problem. Since our goal to clarify via example is better served by working in a simpler context, we apply a more primitive measure to our integration example and look at the n = 1 case (only one function evaluation is allowed). We assume that the only allowable problem elements are functions made up of four linear pieces each having slope with absolute value one. We further assume that such functions have a single point s E (0, 1) with f(s) = 0 (recall that f(0) = f( 1) = 0 as well) and do not change their sign. Finally, we propose a distribution p of such functions whereby the zero point s is uniformly distributed over (0, 1) and the two possible functions withf(s) = 0 are each equally likely (see Fig. 2 ).
In addition to providing some challenge to the Algorithm Designer, imposing this distribution allows us to view Nature's strategies as a parameter space with parameters E (0, 1). In response to this known distribution, the Algorithm Designer also has a one-dimensional space of strategies parameterized by the point r E (0, 1) at which the single function evaluation is made. For added simplicity we require that with information f(t) the Algorithm Designer use the algorithm which takes ~#@(t)> to be the geometric center of the set {Sg : g E F and g(t) = f(t)} of all solution operator values on problem elements having the same information as jC Thus, in this example, variation of strategy by the Algorithm Designer can only occur through the choice of information. Some straightforward geometrical computation yields the following formula for the algorithm $J described above (we give values only for 0 < t I + and forf(t) 2 0 since other results can be determined by symmetry):
if0 <f(t) < t 5: lo iff(t) = 0.
Note that the case with +(f(t)) = 0 arises because only in this instance can both a positive and a negative function (see Fig. 2 ) have the same information, so the Algorithm Designer chooses the midpoint value of the two definite integrals, namely 0. The error function that arises from a specific problem element described by s and information described by t can be shown to have the form if t 5 4 and t 5 sl2 if 4 5 t 5 s/2 ifsi2Itr$andsft ifs = t.
(1)
We note for future reference that the function E(s, t) is continuous on the open unit square except along the line s = t and that E can be extended "continuously" to the closed unit square.
To determine the average case 1st minimal radius we should compute s! E(s, t)ds and then find the minimum value of this function with respect to t. In our example such a computation can be avoided since the symmetry of the situation guarantees that E(s, f) = 0 except at the point s = t, a set of measure 0. Consequently the optimal average case strategy is to choose t = 4 (the same optimal strategy as in the worst case) and the resulting average case radius is rY(S, p) = 0. As expected, this average case radius is smaller than the worst case 1st minimal radius, which has a value of &.
ZERO-SUMTWO-PERSONGAMESANDTHERANDOMIZED ERROR CRITERION
There is already a game-theoretic flavor to what we have developed above. Thus the worst case setting can be viewed as allowing Nature to choose a problem element (strategy) after observing the informationalgorithm pair (strategy) chosen by the Algorithm Designer. Consequently, the Algorithm Designer can do no better than to minimize over the maximal errors omnisciently arranged by Nature.
The average case setting is biased in the other direction, allowing the Algorithm Designer "precise" probabilistic information about the distribution of Nature's choices for problem elements. A hint of what is to follow is given by the fact that Nature is at least permitted to randomize over the problem elements rather than being forced to reveal a pure problem element strategy at the outset.
To find a middle ground between these two potentially biased approaches we need look no further than the beautiful theory of two-person zero-sum games introduced by Von Neumann (1928) and refined in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) . As a first step, we choose a subset F0 of the problem space F as the set of pure strategies for the first player, Nature. The strategy set for the Algorithm Designer is the set A = N,, x Qp, (we regard n as fixed but arbitrary). Let a = (N, 4) denote a generic member of this set. If we take as the payoff function (or utility) for the strategy pair (f, a) the error E(f, a) = I[@--+(Nf)l[, we can regard this as a two-person zero-sum game. Formally, E: F. x A + R defines the game whereby Nature seeks to maximize E(f, a) while the Algorithm Designer seeks to minimize this error.
We digress briefly to note that we are glossing over several important philosophical issues here. We are assuming that the error E(f, a) is regarded as a negative utility by the Algorithm Designer with no real basis for this assumption. Perhaps more seriously, we appear to be ascribing to Nature characteristics of intelligence and utility maximization commonly ascribed to the players in game theory. Both these issues are thoroughly addressed and responded to with some success in Savage (1972) . In fact, our current development is on a path well trodden in statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girshick, 1954) , where the "minimax theory" of statistical games closely parallels the theory of two-person zero-sum games.
Returning to the game defined by E: F0 x A + R, we develop some standard concepts from game theory. The Algorithm Designer, upon choosing strategy a, will face an error of at most E*(u) = SUP~~F~ E(f, a) and can minimize to ensure an error no larger than E * = infaEA E&z). This is precisely the worst case nth minimal radius as defined above. Reasoning analogously from a maximizing Nature's point of view, a choice of strategy fwill ensure a payoff of at least E,(f) = infQEA E(f, a). This can be maximized to guarantee an error of at least E, = SUP~~F~ El(f).
It follows readily that E, 5 E*. Games for which this inequality is in fact an equality are said to have a pure value. Strategiesf* and a* (provided they exist) that yield the appropriate sup and infare called optimal pure strategies. If an information-based complexity problem has a pure value then a worst case treatment becomes very natural since the equilibrium property of an optimal strategy leaves no incentive to (unilaterally) deviate from it. Of course accurate knowledge of a distribution of problem elements (Nature's pure strategies) would call for an average case treatment even in the presence of a pure value.
A major point of this paper is that, in information-based complexity as in most games, existence of a pure value is a most unlikely occurrence. In the absence of a pure value, we take the standard game-theoretic approach of allowing mixed strategies in the form of probability distributions over the strategy spaces. Starting with the game E: FO x A -R, we let P denote a set of probability distributions over Fo and we let A denote a set of probability distributions over the information-algorithm strategy space A. Many technical difficulties are lurking here, but we avoid them by requiring that, unless otherwise specified, sets of probability distributions include at least all discrete probability distributions over the pure strategy space. We do not discuss specifics of nondiscrete distributions that may also be included, though we shall subsequently use integrals in working with general distributions. We choose this approach since information-based complexity generally deals with "continuous" problems and measures.
Letting Al. denote a measure in 8 and (Y a measure in A, the error resulting from each of these mixed strategies is given by We use this rule for l? to define the mixed extension B: fi x A + R to the game E: FO x A ---, R. Repeating the sup and infconstructions on E, we let {&Y) = supPEp ,?$, a) and 8* = inf,,d &(Y). Analogously, we define E,(p) = infolEA E(p, a) and 8, = supper El(p).
In a wide variety of situations this mixed extension game is guaranteed to have a value (k, = 8*). For two-person games where each player has a finite number of pure strategies, this is the celebrated minimax theory of Von Neumann. Leaving more general situations until the next section, we note that the presence of a value and a randomized case setting bring the information-based complexity use of the term "optimal" into full agreement with its game-theoretic use.
Whether or not a value exists, we can now define the randomized case nth minimal radius for an information-based complexity problem defined by S: FO + G with information and algorithm strategy spaces given by N,, and $, respectively, by where 8* is defined as indicated above for the mixed extension of the pure strategy game between Nature and the Algorithm Designer. It can be readily checked that the randomized radius parallels the worst case radius but allows the Algorithm Designer to randomize by choosing mixed information-algorithm pairs to decrease Nature's effectiveness in coming up with a worst case problem element. This idea, along with some of its consequences that we discuss in the next section, is a key motivation for our notion of randomized radius and a randomized setting for treating error and complexity.
We now apply the ideas of this section to the integration example introduced earlier. Working in the n = 1 case where F0 = (0, 1) is parameterized by s and A = (0, 1) is parameterized by t, we obtain from Eq. (I), above, J&(f) = SU~,~(~,~) E(s, t) = $[t2 + (1 -t)2], with the maximum reached at s = t. It follows that E* = $, with the strategy t = 4 yielding this "minimax" value. This simply restates that the worst case 1st minimal radius is Q as we found earlier.
Proceeding from Nature's point of view, we get E,(s) = 0 for all s E (0,l). This follows since the Algorithm Designer can choose t = f when s # t and t arbitrarily close but not equal to 4 otherwise. We then get E, = 0, so it is clear that the pure game has no value and no equilibrium strategy pair. Note that Nature's "best" strategy in this situation is to choose s = 4, in which case the Algorithm Designer does not have a strategy that will ensure a payoff of 0 (the inf that defines E,(s) is not achieved).
Extending to the mixed strategy game, we see the power of mixed strategies to an unrealistic extreme. Choose a sufficiently small interval (say [& -6,+ + S]) about 4 and let the Algorithm Designer vary the choice of evaluation point t with a uniform distribution on this interval. Call this strategy (Ye. Since any mixed strategy of Nature will "match" Nature's choice of s with the Algorithm Designer's choice oft with probability 0, it follows that &((~a) can be made arbitrarily small with 6 and hence that ,!V?* = 0. Consequently, 8, = l?* and the game has a value of 0. No optimal mixed strategy exists for the Algorithm Designer, but the strategies (Ye for small 6 are "almost" optimal strategies.
To show that such an extremely favorable situation need not always exist for the Algorithm Designer, we can change the rules by removing an interval such as (I, 8) from the Algorithm Designer's allowable pure strategies. With the fortuitously favorable t = $ strategy no longer available, the Algorithm Designer must settle for almost optimal mixed strategies uniformly distributed on intervals near 2 or 8. In this game we assert that a value of & is obtained, with an almost optimal pure strategy for Nature provided by choosing s arbitrarily close to 0 or 1. In this restricted game one thus obtains values of & and & for the randomized and worst case radii, respectively, while the average case radius turns out to be &.
The above paragraphs tell us two significant things. First, we have an example of a problem where the randomized case radius is less than the worst case radius. Second, the Algorithm Designer can reduce the (ex-petted) error by employing a mixed algorithm (strategy). Thus, in theory at least, randomized case analysis offers a refinement of the worst case approach and in this former setting the idea of mixed algorithms is unavoidable.
GENERAL RESULTS IN THE RANDOMIZED CASE SETTING
We now apply various standard consequences of the theory of twoperson zero-sum games to information-based complexity. We let n denote the cardinality of information, which is fixed but arbitrary. THEOREM 1. For any problem specified by a solution operator S and an error function E: FO X A + R with A = N,, X a,,, E, 5 8, I ,+ = ,.ydom(,y) I ,y* E ryt(,S).
Furthermore, for any probability distribution p on FO chosen from E, ry(S, p) 5 E, 5 ryd""(S).
Proof.
All the above inequalities follow directly from the various definitions involved. In particular, the result for the average case radius evolves from the fact that ry(S, CL) = El(p) 5 E,.
Thus, as promised earlier, we have shown that the randomized radius is intermediate in value to the average and worst case radii. In cases where exact determination of the randomized radius is difficult, Theorem 1 can provide a way of getting upper and lower bounds. To get an upper bound on the randomized radius, choose any CY = (N, 4) In the application of these ideas to the complexity of discrete problems, Yao (1977) refers to k, as the distributional complexity. Working with error rather than cost, we get the corresponding notion of the distributional radius. This radius represents the largest error that can be ensured by a mixed strategy chosen by Nature regardless of the Algorithm Designer's response.
When the mixed strategy game has a value (& = J?*), these two radii are equal and we give an additional argument for the appropriateness of the randomized setting. In the absence of knowledge of how Nature will provide problem elements, we assume that Nature "seeks" the distribution p* with respect to which the error over strategies from A will be as large as possible @i(p) = e,). If the game has a value, this "maximin" error will be precisely the randomized radius. Thus the randomized radius coincides with the average case radius precisely when the distribution p assumed over problem elements is Nature's optimal mixed strategy.
With the above paragraph as motivation, we now list various conditions under which a two-person zero-sum game will have a value for its mixed extension. Proof. Part (a) is Von Neumann's minimax theorem, while (b) and (c) are standard results found in most game theory texts. Part (d) is more advanced (see Vorob'ev, 1977) .
Result (b) may be useful in what we propose for cases where strategies for Nature and the Algorithm Designer can be described by a finite number of parameters. Our integration example is in this category, but the result does not apply since the error function E is not continuous. We do not give a self-contained statement of result (d), but for many problems arising in information-based complexity it may be the kind of result that is needed to ensure a value.
There are various other results that may be relevant here, but we just mention them briefly. For practical purposes it would be important to know whether optimal strategies can be found that are discrete distributions on the pure strategies and perhaps even pure optimal strategies. Such results depend upon the dimension of the underlying spaces and on appropriate convexity or concavity conditions on the payoff (error) function E. It seems unlikely that such conditions will be satisfied for the kinds of error functions with which we are working.
CONCLUDINGCOMMENTS
The idea of a randomized setting for computing nth minimal radii and hence e-complexity is a natural and appealing one, but it is clear that many technical difficulties must be faced. Algorithmic solution of large finite games is challenging in itself, and systematic methods of attacking games are not currently available. Nonetheless, the randomized setting is a worthwhile conceptual framework for problems in information-based complexity. In response to philosophical objections about the aggressively maximizing and "intelligent" role sometimes ascribed to Nature, we make two points. First, this can be viewed as a convenient abstraction in the absence of any other knowledge about how Nature might behave in supplying problem elements. Second, this is precisely the same role that the worst case setting assumes and the randomized setting lessens, to some extent, the impact of a "hostile" Nature by allowing mixed strategies. In this sense the randomized setting responds to objections raised about both the average case and the worst case settings.
Actual application of the randomized setting to concrete problems offers a considerable challenge. Our unrealistically simple integration example does illustrate, however, that randomized (mixed) strategies by the Algorithm Designer can reduce expected error in the absence of precise knowledge of how Nature will behave. We note that the randomness of our example occurred in the information and not in the algorithm itself. An example where randomization over algorithms is called for would clearly be desirable.
Even in cases where one might assume an "a priori" distribution for the purposes of doing an average case analysis, there may be uncertainty about the mean or the variance of the suspected distribution. In such situations we may deal with the mean or the variance by means of parameter spaces on which to apply a randomized approach. This is a point of view taken in statistical decision theory (Blackwell and Girshick, 1954) .
We have argued that the existence of a value for the mixed extension provides an important additional rationale for the randomized case setting. Theorem 2(d) indicates that continuity of the error function is likely to be a key condition in showing that a value exists for problems in information-based complexity. This suggests that the solution operator S should be continuous, as should the information operators and the algorithms we work with. Such continuity requirements have not played a major role in the worst case setting, but they appear in recent work in the average case setting (Packel and Woiniakowski, 1987) .
Many of the interesting results and important questions treated in the standard settings of information-based complexity lead to new open questions in the context of a randomized setting. Thus, the various positive and negative results on the existence of linear algorithms for linear problems (see Packel, 1987) need to be formulated and examined in the randomized setting. Likewise, the lovely results in both the worst and average cases on the power of nonadaptive information for linear problems (Wasilkowski, 1986 ) might be examined to see if they carry over. It is possible that some of the above results will emerge fairly directly simply by taking a supremum (for average case results) or extending to mixed strategies (for worst case results). We do not pursue these issues in this preliminary paper.
We have restricted ourselves to information with fixed cardinality, but a more realistic approach would allow the algorithm designer to have mixed strategies whose pure components have varying cardinality. The study of information of varying cardinality in a randomized setting requires a significantly broader formulation than we have given here. Some results in context are obtained by Wasilkowski (1987) .
In spite of the difficulties and challenges mentioned above, we submit that a randomized setting can play an important role in complexity theory. Just as game theory, in spite of its relatively small number of triumphs in solving real-world problems, plays a vital role in modeling rational thought and behavior, a randomized approach can lay bare what it means for an algorithm (and its information) to be truly optimal.
